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Previous research has shown that 401(k) participation increases dramatically when 
companies switch from an opt-in to an opt-out (or automatic) enrollment regime (Madrian and 
Shea, 2001; Choi et al. 2004; Choi et al., 2006).  Although automatic enrollment has been widely 
touted as an effective tool for encouraging saving, it has its detractors.  Some libertarians dislike 
automatic enrollment because they view it as coercing individuals into the company-chosen 
default contribution rate and asset allocation.  Indeed, the vast majority of automatically enrolled 
employees passively accept all of the defaults in the short run, and many remain at those defaults 
for years (Choi et al., 2004; Choi et al., 2006).  Paternalists, in contrast, like the fact that 
automatic enrollment increases 401(k) participation but object to companies choosing default 
contribution rates that they perceive as  too low and asset allocations that are too conservative.1 
Firms, however, have been reluctant to adopt more aggressive defaults for fear of participant 
lawsuits should the default investments decline in value. 
One reason that automatic enrollment increases 401(k) participation is that it reduces the 
complexity of the decision-making task. Rather than evaluating all possible contribution rate and 
asset allocation options, employees need only compare the automatic enrollment default with 
non-participation.  Relative to plans with automatic enrollment, opt-in plans impose a much 
greater decision-making burden on enrollees.  But a high level of complexity in an opt-in plan is 
not necessary.  There are ways to reduce complexity that are not as extreme as adopting 
automatic enrollment. 
In this paper, we analyze one such alternative called Quick EnrollmentTM by Hewitt 
Associates2.  Quick Enrollment gives employees the option of enrolling in the savings plan by 
opting into a default contribution rate and asset allocation pre-selected by the employer.  If Quick 
Enrollment succeeds in reducing complexity by allowing employees to focus on evaluating a 
smaller subset of options (e.g., non-enrollment and the default), savings plan participation should 
increase relative to a standard opt-in enrollment regime.  The fact that all Quick Enrollment 
elections are affirmative also addresses both the libertarian and paternalist objections to 
automatic enrollment.  For libertarians, there is no “coercion” into the default.  For paternalists, 
affirmative elections reduce the legal risks from choosing a less conservative default asset 
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allocation. The implementations studied in this paper may also motivate increased 401(k) 
participation by giving employees a deadline for using Quick Enrollment to join the 401(k) plan, 
akin to the “active decision” approach to 401(k) enrollment analyzed in Choi et al. (2005). 
We evaluate three different implementations of Quick Enrollment at two firms. Two of 
the implementations were short-term interventions that targeted non-participating employees 
who had previously been hired by the firms we study. The third was an ongoing intervention for 
newly hired employees. For all three implementations, we find that Quick Enrollment resulted in 
substantial 401(k) participation increases, although these increases are not nearly as large as 
those obtained through automatic enrollment in other firms. We also document the importance of 
the Quick Enrollment default for contribution rate and asset allocation outcomes. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section I describes the implementation of Quick 
Enrollment at the two firms we study and the data that we use to analyze its effect. Section II 
presents the results of our empirical analysis at the first company. Section III presents the results 
of our empirical analysis at the second company. We conclude in Section IV by comparing 
Quick Enrollment with other mechanisms for influencing 401(k) savings outcomes. 
 
Section I. Quick Enrollment Implementation at Two Firms 
 The first Quick Enrollment implementation we study was at a large health services 
company—hereafter referred to as Company A—with approximately 40,000 employees at more 
than 20 locations. Table 1 gives demographic characteristics for the active employees at this firm 
on December 31, 2003, along with characteristics of all private sector employees in the March 
2003 Current Population Survey (CPS) as a basis for comparison. Relative to the U.S. 
population, Company A workers are slightly older, earn a little more, and are much more likely 
to be female. 
 Table 2 presents features of the 401(k) plan at Company A. Virtually all Company A 
employees in our data are immediately eligible for the 401(k) plan. At most locations, employees 
who are at least 21 years old and have attained 1,000 hours of service are eligible for a 50% 
matching contribution from the company on the first 4% or 6% of pay contributed to the plan. 
Employees may contribute up to 100% of their pay (provided their contributions do not exceed 
the IRS dollar contribution limits) to 11 different investment options. There is no employer stock 
in the fund menu. 
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 Figure 1 shows the Quick Enrollment timeline at Company A. Prior to July 2003, the 
company used a standard opt-in enrollment process: employees were not enrolled in the 401(k) 
plan unless they made an affirmative election through a toll-free phone call to the firm’s benefits 
administrator or through visiting the benefits administration Web site. 401(k) participation, 
contribution rate, and investment allocation changes could be made at any time. 
 In July 2003, Company A adopted Quick Enrollment on a trial basis at its main location. 
New employees attending orientation were given Quick Enrollment cards which gave them the 
choice of checking a box to initiate 401(k) participation at a contribution rate of 2% of salary 
(before tax) and a pre-selected asset allocation (50% in a money market fund and 50% in a 
balanced fund). Returning the Quick Enrollment card was not mandatory and was not described 
to employees as mandatory. However, the cards did list a deadline of 2 weeks after orientation 
for submitting the card if the employees wished to use the Quick Enrollment process (the 
deadline on the card was a specific date which changed according to when the new employee 
orientation was held).3 
 From July through September, the Quick Enrollment form gave employees two options: 
“Yes! I want to enroll . . . and begin saving in the [Company A] Savings Plan” and “No. I don’t 
want to enroll at this time.” From October to December, the “No” option was eliminated from 
the Quick Enrollment form to investigate whether making non-participation salient through the 
“No” option affected enrollment. Failure to return either version of the form was treated as a 
negative 401(k) participation election. Employees also had the option to initiate participation on 
their own at any contribution rate and with any investment allocation through the standard 
channels (phone or Internet) throughout this time. In February 2004, Company A adopted Quick 
Enrollment as a permanent feature of its new employee orientation, with continued use of the 
yes-only form. 
 The second Quick Enrollment implementation took place at Company A from mid-June 
through early fall 2004 for non-participating employees who were already at the firm. This 
implementation occurred in conjunction with the adoption of a new Web-based benefits 
management system for all employees. As part of the transition to this new system, the company 
had employees meet individually with representatives of an outside vendor to help them register 
on the new system. These meetings were not designed to be individual financial planning 
sessions, but representatives answered questions about company benefits—in particular, the 
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firm’s life insurance products and savings plan. Non-participating employees were given the 
opportunity to enroll in the 401(k) plan using a Web-based Quick Enrollment interface. This 
implementation offered the same asset allocation as the new hire implementation, but employees 
could choose any pre-tax contribution rate. Employees did not have the option to use the web-
based Quick Enrollment option after the meeting.  
 The third Quick Enrollment implementation that we study is at Company B, a firm in the 
manufacturing industry. This company employs approximately 20,000 individuals. Table 1 gives 
demographic characteristics for the active employees at this firm on December 31, 2003. 
Company B employees are significantly older than the U.S. average and much more likely to be 
male. Other demographic data (e.g. race/ethnicity and pay) are not available for this company. 
 Table 2 describes the 401(k) plan features at Company B. Employees are immediately 
eligible for the 401(k) plan, which provides a variable matching contribution between 55% and 
125%, depending on company profitability. on the first 6% of pay contributed to the plan. The 
employer match is invested in employer stock. Employees may contribute up to 25% of pay 
(subject to the IRS dollar contribution limits) and choose among nine investment options, 
including employer stock. 
 Quick Enrollment at Company B was implemented as a one-time mailing to non-
participating employees already at the firm in the latter half of January 2003. Employees were 
given the option to check a box to enroll in the 401(k) plan at a 3% (before-tax) contribution rate 
invested entirely in a money market fund. Figure 2 shows the Quick Enrollment timeline at 
Company B. Although employees at Company B were given a two-week deadline for returning 
the Quick Enrollment cards, this deadline was not binding in practice. Cards returned after the 
deadline were held and processed in May 2003. 
The data we use to analyze Quick Enrollment at these two firms come from Hewitt 
Associates, a large benefits administration and consulting firm. The data are a series of year-end 
cross-sections of all employees at Companies A and B. For Company A, we have cross-sections 
from year-end 2002, year-end 2003, and September 1, 2004. For Company B, we have cross-
sections from year-ends 2002 and 2003. These cross-sections contain demographic information 
such as birth date, hire date, gender, state of residence, and compensation.4 They also contain 
point-in-time information on 401(k) savings outcomes, including participation status in the plan, 
date of first participation, the contribution rate, asset allocation, and total balances. In addition, 
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we have ethnicity data for Company A employees active at year-end 2003 and September 1, 
2004. 
 
Section II. Quick Enrollment and 401(k) Outcomes at Company A 
 In designing the Quick Enrollment implementation at Company A, our initial intent was 
to compare participation under three enrollment mechanisms: the yes/no Quick Enrollment card, 
the yes-only Quick Enrollment card, and the standard opt-in enrollment protocol without Quick 
Enrollment. The empirical methodology to do this would have been straightforward: we would 
have three different treatment regimes and treated and untreated locations (the main location 
versus everywhere else). The untreated locations would allow us to control for time effects that 
might otherwise confound comparisons of the different enrollment regimes at the treated 
location. 
 Our ability to carry out this methodology in a completely convincing fashion has been 
limited by three factors. First, although Quick Enrollment forms were only distributed at the 
main location’s orientation sessions, employees do not necessarily attend orientation at the 
location where they work. Therefore, a nontrivial number of employees at the “untreated” 
locations actually had the opportunity to use Quick Enrollment. This contamination of the 
control locations will cause a comparison of the main location against other locations to 
underestimate the Quick Enrollment effect. Second, after seeing Quick Enrollment’s success at 
the new employee orientations from July to September 2003, the benefits office decided to 
distribute Quick Enrollment forms at the firm’s annual benefits fairs in October and November 
2003. These benefits fairs were held at many locations, providing additional exposure to Quick 
Enrollment for employees at locations that would otherwise serve as controls. Third, the 
coincident timing of the benefits fairs with the yes-only Quick Enrollment form precludes a clean 
comparison of the yes-no and yes-only forms, since new employees also potentially attended the 
benefits fairs. 
 However, the permanent adoption of the yes-only Quick Enrollment form in February 
2004 at the main location orientation sessions allows us to compare 401(k) outcomes at the main 
location from February 2004 onward to outcomes at the main location prior to Quick 
Enrollment’s initial implementation in July 2003. 
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 Recall that the firm offered Quick Enrollment in a different fashion to non-participating 
employees from June to August 2004 in conjunction with its Web-based benefits management 
program rollout. Because of this, we restrict our initial Quick Enrollment analysis to employees 
hired from February to May 2004, and we do not examine these employee’s 401(k) outcomes 
beyond mid-June 2004. We use as our control group employees hired from February to May 
2003 and February to May 2002. Table 3 shows that the demographic characteristics of 
employees at the company’s mail location who were hired from February to May of 2002, 2003, 
and 2004 appear very similar. 
 Figure 3 plots the 401(k) participation rate against tenure for employees hired at the 
company’s main location before and after Quick Enrollment. For employees hired from February 
to May of 2002 and 2003, the 401(k) participation paths track each other quite closely, 
suggesting no dramatic changes in employee characteristics or other factors influencing 401(k) 
participation. The participation rates for newly hired employees are extremely low: about 5% 
after the first month of employment and 15% after 12 months. The participation rates under 
Quick Enrollment are dramatically higher: 19% after the first month of employment and 35% in 
the third month. We do not calculate Quick Enrollment participation rates at higher tenure levels 
because they would be potentially contaminated by the June to August intervention described 
above. 
 Figures 4A and 4B show the one-month and three-month participation rates at the 
company’s main location by hire month. Although there is some participation rate variability 
across hire months both before and after Quick Enrollment, this variation is dwarfed by the large 
participation increases generated by Quick Enrollment. 
 To control for potential differences in the demographic composition of employees hired 
before and after Quick Enrollment, we run probit regressions of one-month and three-month 
participation in the 401(k) plan on age, gender, race, compensation, and a Quick Enrollment 
dummy, which is set to 1 for employees hired from February to May 2004. The sample in these 
regressions is employees hired from February to May of 2002, 2003 and 2004, with the 
employees hired in 2002 and 2003 serving as a pre-Quick Enrollment control group.5  The first 
two columns of Table 4 list the marginal effects at the sample means from the probit regressions 
for employees at the firm’s main location where Quick Enrollment was used. The only 
statistically significant demographic characteristics are compensation and age: higher-paid and 
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older employees are much more likely to enroll. The Quick Enrollment effect is large and 
statistically significant, increasing the 1-month participation rate by 14 percentage points and the 
3-month participation rate by 16 percentage points. This represents a tripling of the one- and 
three-month participation rates prior to Quick Enrollment.6 
 Because Quick Enrollment was only distributed at the main location orientations, a useful 
specification check is to see whether there is a Quick Enrollment effect at other locations. The 
last two columns of Table 4 present regression results for employees working at other locations. 
The Quick Enrollment coefficients are small in magnitude and statistically insignificant. These 
results suggest that estimated Quick Enrollment effect at the main location is indeed caused by 
Quick Enrollment and not spurious correlation with other factors. 
 Table 5 examines which employees are most affected by Quick Enrollment.  In the first 
two columns, we break down the one-month participation rate by various demographic 
characteristics for employees hired prior to Quick Enrollment (February to May of 2002 and 
2003) and after Quick Enrollment (February to May 2004).7  The last two columns of Table 5 
divide the post-Quick Enrollment participants into two subgroups:  those who enrolled using a 
non-Quick Enrollment channel, and those who enrolled using Quick Enrollment.  Because we do 
not have data on who actually used Quick Enrollment, we attribute Quick Enrollment utilization 
to those employees who have the Quick Enrollment default asset allocation.  Although this 
approach may generate some classification error, the magnitude is likely to be quite small given 
that none of the new hires from January to June 2003 (before Quick Enrollment) who enrolled 
within their first month of employment elected the default asset allocation.8 
For all of the demographic groups listed in Table 5, 401(k) participation rates are 
substantially higher under Quick Enrollment (column 1 vs. column 2). The absolute size of the 
participation increase is largest among those who are ages 30 to 50 (22 percentage points) and 
earning more than $25,000 (26 percentage points for those earning between $25,000 and 
$50,000, and 32 percentage points for those earning more than $50,000).  The proportional 
increase relative to pre-Quick Enrollment participation rates is largest among blacks (385%), 
those earning less than $25,000 (396%), and those ages 30 to 50 men (292%).  Across all 
demographic groups, over 75% of all new-hire enrollments in the post-Quick Enrollment period 
occur through Quick Enrollment.  Quick Enrollment is especially popular among blacks (83%) 
and those earning less than $25,000 (82%). 
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 As discussed previously, Company A’s second Quick Enrollment implementation 
occurred from mid-June to early fall of 2004 in conjunction with the new benefits management 
Web site rollout. The aggregate participation impact of this extension of Quick Enrollment 
extension to all non-participating employees is striking (Figure 5). During a two-and-a-half 
month period, the firm’s overall participation rate increased from 50% to 60%, converting 20% 
of non-participants into participants. The effects are similar for employees at both the main 
location and at other locations, which is not surprising given that in this intervention, Quick 
Enrollment was made available to all non-participating employees regardless of location. 
 Table 6, which is analogous to Table 5, examines the impact of Quick Enrollment on 
different demographic groups.  The first column is the fraction of previously non-participating 
employees who enrolled from June to August of 2002 and 2003, prior to the adoption of Quick 
Enrollment.9  The second column gives the fraction of non-participating employees enrolling 
from June to August of 2003 during the second Quick Enrollment implement at Company A.  
This is disaggregated in the last two columns according to whether the enrollment occurred 
through Quick Enrollment or not. Again, we identify Quick Enrollment usage through the 
presence of the default asset allocation which was elected by virtually none of the employees 
who initiated plan participation prior to Quick Enrollment. 
 For all demographic groups, 401(k) enrollment rates are much higher under Quick 
Enrollment, and the vast majority of enrollments (92% across the entire population) are 
submitted through Quick Enrollment. Absolute enrollment changes are largest for women (24 
percentage points), blacks (24 percentage points), those earning more than $25,000 (26 
percentage points for those earning between $25,000 and $50,000, and 33 percentage points for 
those earning more than $50,000), those aged 30 to 50 (24 percentage points), and those who 
have been at the company more than five years (26 percentage points). Relative increases are 
largest for those between ages 30 and 50 (823%), women (771%), blacks (1764%), those making 
less than $25,000 a year (935%), and those who have been at the company for more than five 
years (1200%). 
 Given the evidence from previous research on the impact of defaults on 401(k) 
contribution rates and asset allocation, it is natural to ask how Quick Enrollment, which can be 
viewed as a default that is opted into, affects these same outcomes.  We have already noted that 
virtually no participants enrolling in the 401(k) plan prior to Quick Enrollment selected the 
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default asset allocation (indeed, we identified Quick Enrollment usage by whether the 
participant’s asset allocation matched the Quick Enrollment default.)  In contrast, 73% of newly 
hired participants (Table 5) and 92% of new participants among existing employees (Table 6) 
had the Quick Enrollment default asset allocation in the post-Quick Enrollment period.  Clearly 
Quick Enrollment has an important effect on asset allocation outcomes. 
 Not surprisingly, Quick Enrollment has similar effects on contribution rates as well.  
Figure 6 shows the effect of Quick Enrollment on the distribution of contribution rates for new 
employees thirty days after hire.10 As is typical in companies with an employer match, the modal 
contribution rate prior to Quick Enrollment is the employer match threshold of 6%; 
approximately 1% of new hires or 25% of newly hired participants contribute at this rate. Under 
Quick Enrollment, however, the modal contribution rate shifts to 2%, the Quick Enrollment 
default. The fraction of employees contributing 2% increases more than 20-fold, from less than 
1% of employees to 14% of employees. This represents an increase from 13% of participants to 
75% of participants.  We find no evidence for the type of contribution rate displacement that has 
been observed with automatic enrollment.  Indeed, the increase in the fraction of employees 
contributing 2% of pay to the 401(k) plan at one month of tenure is approximately equal to the 
one-month participation increase attributable to Quick Enrollment from the probit regression in 
column 1 of Table 1. 
 The second Quick Enrollment implementation, which occurred in conjunction with the 
individual Web site registrations, gave employees the option to choose any contribution rate in 
conjunction with the Quick Enrollment default asset allocation. We would therefore expect less 
clustering at any particular contribution rate.  Figure 7 shows the distribution of contribution 
rates for employees hired prior to June 2003, before Quick Enrollment was adopted in any form 
at Company A, at two points in time. The first distribution is from June 1, 2004, three weeks 
before the registration period Quick Enrollment implementation began, and the second is from 
September 1, 2004, which is our last data snapshot after this second Quick Enrollment 
implementation. As in Figure 6, the modal contribution rate before Quick Enrollment is the 
match threshold of 6%. Under Quick Enrollment, the fraction of employees with contribution 
rates between 1% and 6% increases noticeably, while there is little effect above 6%.  Because 
Quick Enrollment participants are spread across several contribution rates, the match threshold 
remains the modal contribution rate. 
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Section III. Quick Enrollment and 401(k) Outcomes at Company B 
 We now turn to the Quick Enrollment implement at Company B which, similar to the 
second implement at Company A, also targeted previously hired non-participating employees.11 
As mentioned in Section I, this company executed a one-time mailing in late January 2003 to 
non-participating employees. Those returning the reply card were enrolled in the 401(k) plan at a 
3% contribution rate, and all these contributions were invested in a money market fund. Cards 
returned by the deadline were processed in February 2003; late reply cards were processed in 
May 2003. 
 In the case of Company B, our data identifies the employees who were mailed the Quick 
Enrollment cards. To measure the effect of Quick Enrollment, we need to identify what these 
recipients would have done in the absence of Quick Enrollment. We use two control groups for 
this purpose. The first is employees who were not participating on February 1, 2002, a year prior 
to Quick Enrollment. The second is the 16% of non-participants on February 1, 2003 who did not 
receive the Quick Enrollment mailing. We are not certain why the company did not send these 
employees Quick Enrollment cards.12 Because selection into this group is unlikely to be random, 
comparisons with the Quick Enrollment recipients must be interpreted with caution. 
 Figure 8 shows the 401(k) participation time series for four groups of Company B 
employees: all non-participating employees as of February 1, 2002; all Quick Enrollment 
recipients; non-participants as of February 1, 2003 who received the Quick Enrollment mailing; 
and non-participants as of February 1, 2003 who did not receive the Quick Enrollment mailing. 
The x-axis in Figure 8, labeled “time since baseline”, is the number of months since February 1, 
2002 for non-participants as of that date, and number of months since February 1, 2003 for the 
other three groups. Quick Enrollment forms are first processed between months 0 and 1 
(February and March of 2003); the final processing of forms takes place between months 3 and 4 
(May and June of 2003). Our time series for the February 2002 non-participants begins at 
February 2002, when our contribution rate data begin, and ends before the January 2003 Quick 
Enrollment mailing to avoid contamination with the Quick Enrollment mailing to some members 
of this group. 
 The February 2002 non-participants show a slow and steady increase in participation over 
time, with a participation rate of approximately 10% after ten months.  The February 2003 non-
  
11
 
participants who did not receive the Quick Enrollment mailing show a somewhat more sluggish 
increase in participation, with 6% of this group having enrolled after ten months (note the 
possible selection bias for this latter group).  In contrast, the participation rate of Quick 
Enrollment recipients increases markedly between months 0 and 1, and again between months 3 
and 4, which are exactly when the Quick Enrollment forms were processed. The group of all 
Quick Enrollment recipients participates at a slightly higher rate (about 3 percentage points) than 
February 2003 non-participants who received Quick Enrollment. This difference, however, is 
completely accounted for by the fact that some Quick Enrollment recipients enrolled on their 
own in the lag between the time when the non-participant mailing list was drawn up and when 
these individuals actually received the mailing (that participation increase between time -1 and 0 
for this group). 
 The patterns in Figure 8 suggest that a plausible measure of Quick Enrollment’s impact is 
the participation difference between the February 2002 non-participants and the February 2003 
non-participants who received Quick Enrollment. Averaging this difference over months 1 to 10 
yields a 10 percentage point participation increase due to Quick Enrollment. At month 4, a few 
weeks after the last forms were processed, this represents a near tripling of the participation rate. 
However, company-wide participation increased by only 2 percentage points from a baseline of 
74% between February 1 and June 1 of 2003. 
 There are several potential reasons why the Quick Enrollment effect was smaller at 
Company B than at Company A. First, Company B’s initial participation rate was much higher, 
so the potential scope for increasing participation was smaller. Second, Company B’s Quick 
Enrollment options may have been less attractive. Respondents were limited to only one 
contribution rate (3%) rather than many, and the available asset allocation was a money market 
fund rather than a mix of a money market fund and a balanced fund. Third, Company A had been 
using Quick Enrollment for new hires for almost a year when they began targeting previously 
hired non-participants, so there may have been a greater initial awareness and acceptance of 
Quick Enrollment. Finally, Company B’s Quick Enrollment forms were distributed through a 
mailing, whereas Company A’s forms were presented to employees in person. 
 Table 7, which is analogous to Tables 5 and 6, reports enrollment rates for various 
demographic groups at Company B. Enrollees under the Quick Enrollment regime are compared 
to employees who enrolled a year prior. As in Table 5 and 6, we attribute Quick Enrollment 
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utilization to those employees with the Quick Enrollment default asset allocation.  Of Company 
B employees who enrolled between January 1, 2002 and February 18, 2003 (just prior to the 
initial Quick Enrollment processing), only 5.9% had the Quick Enrollment default asset 
allocation at the end of their initial participation year. In contrast, 75% of those enrolling 
between February and May 2003 chose the Quick Enrollment default asset allocation. 
As in Company A, we find that enrollment rates are higher under Quick Enrollment for 
all demographic groups at Company B and that the majority of enrollees use Quick Enrollment 
rather than a traditional enrollment channel. The largest absolute changes are among those over 
age 30 (14 percentage points for those between ages 30 and 50, and 15 percentage points for 
those over age 50) and those who have less than five years of tenure (16 percentage points).  The 
largest relative changes are among those over age 50 (434%) those with more than five years of 
tenure (1050%). 
 Figure 9 shows the month 4 contribution rate distribution at Company B for the four 
employee groups in Figure 8. We do not show employees with a zero contribution rate in order 
to highlight the differences across the other contribution rates. As in Company A, the impact of 
Quick Enrollment on contribution rates is readily apparent. Almost none of the employees who 
did not receive Quick Enrollment chose a 3% contribution rate. Instead most enrollees chose 
rates at or above the 6% match threshold. In contrast, participants who received the Quick 
Enrollment mailing are largely enrolled at the 3% default contribution rate.  In Company B we 
do find some evidence of contribution rate displacement.  The 12% fraction of Quick Enrollment 
recipients at the default contribution rate exceeds the 10% impact of Quick Enrollment on 
participation.  Quick Enrollment recipients at the 3% contribution rate thus appear to be 
comprised both of employees brought into the plan because of Quick Enrollment and of 
employees who would have enrolled at a different—and likely higher—contribution rate in the 
absence of Quick Enrollment. The magnitude of the contribution rate displacement is similar to 
that estimated for automatic enrollment (Madrian and Shea, 2001; Choi et al, 2004). 
 
Section IV. Conclusions 
 Madrian and Shea (2001), Iyengar and Jiang (2003), and Iyengar et al. (2004) have 
argued that the complexity of the 401(k) savings decision discourages employees from timely 
enrollment, even when they prefer participation to non-participation. Quick Enrollment is a low-
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cost manipulation that reduces this complexity by allowing employees to enroll at a default 
contribution rate and asset allocation pre-selected by the employer. We find that Quick 
Enrollment tripled participation among new hires relative to a standard enrollment mechanism in 
which employees must actively select both a contribution rate and an asset allocation. When 
Quick Enrollment was made available to previously hired employees who were not participating 
in their 401(k) plan, 10% to 20% of these non-participants enrolled in the plan. 
 Quick Enrollment has a much smaller participation effect than automatic enrollment, 
which typically induces near-universal participation. But relative to automatic enrollment, Quick 
Enrollment has the benefit of protecting employers from litigation if they pick defaults with 
equity exposure, since Quick Enrollment is an opt-in mechanism. Like automatic enrollment, 
Quick Enrollment causes clustering of enrollees at the employer-selected contribution rate and 
asset allocation. Those at the Quick Enrollment defaults include not only employees who would 
not have enrolled without Quick Enrollment, but also employees who would have otherwise 
enrolled with other elections. It is unlikely that this herding is first-best for employees. However, 
Quick Enrollment induces less herding than automatic enrollment. 
 The “active decision” approach to 401(k) participation—an alternative 401(k) enrollment 
mechanism studied by Choi et al. (2005)—requires employees to proactively make a retirement 
savings decision by a specific deadline without any employer guidance. The active decision 
participation effect lies well above the Quick Enrollment effect and below the automatic 
enrollment effect. The active decision approach’s advantage is that there is no clustering of 
savings outcomes; the contribution rate distribution three months after hire under active decision 
is indistinguishable from the contribution rate distribution three years after hire under a standard 
opt-in enrollment regime. On the other hand, active decision forces employees to struggle with a 
difficult decision in a domain where they may have little expertise. A mechanism that gives 
employees a hard deadline with a Quick Enrollment option that has a small number of choices 
may be a fruitful hybrid approach.13 
 Another issue which should attract additional study is the optimal number of Quick 
Enrollment options. Quick Enrollment’s primary goal is to increase 401(k) participation by 
reducing the complexity of enrolling in the 401(k) plan. However, employees who do not like the 
Quick Enrollment default will be unlikely to use it to enroll. Increasing the number of Quick 
Enrollment options makes Quick Enrollment attractive to a greater number of employees but also 
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increases its complexity. An extremely large number of pre-bundled savings options would 
defeat the purpose of Quick Enrollment. However, increasing the number of options from one to 
two is unlikely to significantly increase Quick Enrollment’s complexity. 
 Recent psychology research provides a framework for thinking about these issues. There 
are two potential sources of complexity in this 401(k) decision: choosing an appropriate 
contribution rate and choosing an appropriate asset allocation. Expanding the array of Quick 
Enrollment options could involve increasing either the number of contribution rate options (as in 
Company A’s second Quick Enrollment implementation for non-participating employees), the 
number of asset allocation options, or both. One key difference between contribution rates and 
asset allocations is the extent to which the available options are easily comparable. Different 
contribution rates are alignable outcomes—they can be easily ordered from low to high—and 
this makes the different possible choices easier to compare (Gourville and Soman, 2005). In 
contrast, different asset allocations are non-alignable outcomes: they vary in non-comparable 
dimensions like expected return, currency risk, inflation risk, business cycle risk, management 
fees, etc. 
 Gourville and Soman (2005) report results from brand choice experiments showing that 
increasing a brand’s alignable options increases the probability that consumers purchase from 
that brand, whereas increasing non-alignable options decreases purchase probability. Other 
papers that look only at the impact of increasing non-alignable options find that more options 
increase the likelihood of not choosing anything (Dhar and Nowlis, 1999; Iyengar and Lepper, 
2000). Most importantly for this paper’s results, Iyengar and Jiang (2003) and Huberman, 
Iyengar and Jiang (2004) find a negative relationship between the number of funds in a 401(k) 
investment menu and 401(k) participation rates. This result holds even among firms with a 
relatively low number of funds. 
 In summary, the literature on the psychology of consumer choice suggests that increasing 
the number of alignable options (i.e. savings rates), will lead to increased Quick Enrollment 
utilization, whereas increasing the number of non-alignable options (i.e. asset allocation options), 
will lead to reduced Quick Enrollment utilization. The Quick Enrollment implementation for 
non-participating employees at Company A does not provide a direct test of this conjecture, as 
there was no variation in the number of contribution rate or asset allocation options. But it is 
worth noting that Quick Enrollment was very effective in increasing participation even when 
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employees were able to choose from the full array of (alignable) contribution rates. Further 
research on this front, where both the number of contribution rates and the number of asset 
allocation options were varied, would be informative for both the optimal design of Quick 
Enrollment-like interventions and for the literature on the psychology of choice more generally. 
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Table 1. Employee Characteristics  
 Company A 
Active Employees 
on Dec 31, 2003 
Company B 
Active Employees 
on Dec 31, 2003 
Private sector 
employees 
March 2003 CPS 
Average age (years) 41.9 45.3 39.0 
Percent male 26.5% 76.2% 53.4% 
Compensation    
 Avg. annual income $38,321 - $36,782 
 Median annual income $28,523 - $27,000 
Ethnic composition    
 White 84.3% - 83.1% 
 Black 12.7% - 10.5% 
 Other 3.0% - 6.3% 
Number of employees ~40,000 ~20,000 - 
Source: Authors’ calculations. Information on ethnicity and income is not available for Company B. Private 
household workers are excluded from our sample for the U.S. private sector (column 3). 
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Table 2. 401(k) Plan Features  
 Company A Company B 
Eligibility   
Eligible employees Some small groups of employees not eligible 
(e.g., independent contractors, union 
employees). 
U.S. employees 
   
First eligible Immediately upon hire Immediately upon hire 
   
Employer match eligible Age 21 + 1,000 hours of service Immediately upon hire 
   
Enrollment Daily Daily 
   
Employee contributions Up to 100% of compensation Up to 25% of compensation 
   
Employer matching contributions   
Match rate and threshold Depending on location and pay group, most 
employees receive a 50% match on the first 
4% or 6% of pay contributed 
Between 55% and 125% on the first 6% of pay 
contributed,, depending on company profitability 
   
Investment restrictions No restrictions on employer match Matching contributions invested 100% in 
employer stock. May diversify 25% of balances at 
age 45, up to 100% at age 55. 
   
Vesting of employer match Vests 100% in 3 years Immediate 
   
Other   
Loans Available Available 
Hardship withdrawals Available Available 
Investment choices 11 options (no employer stock) 9 options, including employer stock 
Source:  Plan documents. 
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Table 3. Employee Characteristics by Hire Cohort: Company A (Main Location) 
 Feb-May 2002 
cohort 
in Jun 2002 
Feb-May 2003 
cohort 
in Jun 2003 
Feb-May 2004  
cohort 
in Jun 2004 
Average age (years) 31.4 32.0 32.7 
Percent male 27.6% 28.6% 28.9% 
Compensation    
 Avg. annual income $19,510 $20,928 $22,918 
 Median annual income $16,619 $17,282 $17,581 
Ethnic composition    
 White 77.1% 79.1% 75.6% 
 Black 20.6% 17.9% 21.6% 
 Other 2.3% 3.0% 2.8% 
Number of employees 455 407 733 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Table 4. Probit Regressions of 401(k) Enrollment at Company A: New Hires 
 Main Location Other locations 
 Enrolled in 
1 month 
Enrolled in 
3 months 
Enrolled in 
1 month 
Enrolled in 
3 months 
Age (years) 0.0013* 
(0.0006) 
0.0031* 
(0.0013) 
-0.0003 
(0.0008) 
0.0006 
(0.0013) 
Female 0.0034 
(0.0147) 
0.0191 
(0.0300) 
0.0436* 
(0.0152) 
0.0109 
(0.0320) 
Black 0.0048 
(0.0178) 
-0.0544 
(0.0329) 
-0.0241 
(0.0211) 
-0.0525 
(0.0305) 
Other/unknown race -0.0118 
(0.0367) 
-0.0137 
(0.0721) --
a --a 
Pay ($1000s) 0.0031** 
(0.0004) 
0.0036** 
(0.0006) 
0.0028** 
(0.0004) 
0.0032** 
(0.0007) 
Quick Enrollment 
cohort 
0.1398** 
(0.0174) 
0.1630** 
(0.0367) 
0.0265 
(0.0189) 
-0.0192 
(0.0286) 
Sample size N=1613 N=610 N=776 N=307 
Pseudo R2 0.1667 0.1468 0.1515 0.1787 
Source: Authors’ calculations.  The table reports marginal effects at sample means from a probit regression 
where the dependent variable is whether the employee has enrolled in the 401(k) either one or three months 
after hire.  The sample in the one-month regressions is employees hired from February to May of 2002, 
2003 and 2004.  The sample in the three-month regressions is employees hired in February and March of 
2002, 2003 and 2004.   Female, Black, and Other/Unknown race are dummy variables. Quick Enrollment 
cohort is a dummy for employees hired from February to May 2004 in the one-month regression and in 
February and March 2004 in the three-month regression. Standard errors are in parentheses under the point 
estimates.  
** denotes significance at the 1% level. * denotes significance at the 5% level. 
a None of the sample of other/unknown race enrolled within 3 months of hire. Consequently, all of these 
employees as well as the Other/unknown race variable were dropped from this regression. 
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Table 5. Enrollment Rates by Employee Characteristics: 
New Hires at Company A’s Main Location at One Month of Tenure 
 Before 
Quick Enrollment 
 
After Quick Enrollment 
 Fraction  
enrolling at any  
allocation 
Fraction  
enrolling at any  
allocation 
Fraction enrolling 
at non-default 
allocation 
Fraction enrolling 
at QE default 
allocation 
Age     
 < 30 4.4% 
[528] 
12.2% 
[319] 
3.4% 
[319] 
8.8% 
[319] 
 30 – 50 7.4% 
[394] 
29.3% 
[222] 
7.7% 
[222] 
21.6% 
[222] 
 > 50 8.1% 
[86] 
26.5% 
[64] 
6.3% 
[64] 
20.3% 
[64] 
Gender     
 Female 5.9% 
[716] 
18.5% 
[426] 
4.5% 
[426] 
14.1% 
[426] 
 Male 5.8% 
[292] 
23.5% 
[179] 
7.3% 
[179] 
16.2% 
[179] 
Race/Ethnicity     
 Black 3.9% 
[205] 
18.0% 
[133] 
3.0% 
[133] 
15.0% 
[133] 
 White 6.1% 
[776] 
21.4% 
[454] 
6.2% 
[454] 
15.2% 
[454] 
 Other/unknown 14.8% 
[27] 
0 
[18] 
0 
[18] 
0 
[18] 
Compensation     
 < $25K 2.7% 
[734] 
13.0% 
[460] 
2.4% 
[460] 
10.7% 
[460] 
 $25K-$50K 10.0% 
[211] 
35.5% 
[107] 
11.2% 
[107] 
24.3% 
[107] 
 >$50K 28.6% 
[63] 
60.5% 
[38] 
23.6% 
[38] 
36.8% 
[38] 
Source: Authors’ calculations.  The sample in column 1 is employees hired from February to May of 2002 and 2003.  
The sample in the remaining columns is employees hired from February to May of 2004.  Sample sizes for each cell 
reported in brackets. 
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Table 6. Enrollment Rates by Employee Characteristics: 
Previously Non-Participating Employees at Company A 
 Before 
Quick Enrollment 
 
After Quick Enrollment 
 Fraction  
enrolling at any  
allocation 
Fraction  
enrolling at any  
allocation 
Fraction enrolling 
at non-default 
allocation 
Fraction enrolling 
at QE default 
allocation 
Age     
 < 30 3.2% 
[5103] 
24.8% 
[2560] 
2.3% 
[2560] 
22.5% 
[2560] 
 30 – 50 3.0% 
[4001] 
26.5% 
[1871] 
1.7% 
[1871] 
24.7% 
[1871] 
 > 50 5.1% 
[686] 
17.7% 
[367] 
1.1% 
[367] 
16.6% 
[367] 
Gender     
 Female 3.2% 
[7092] 
26.7% 
[3489] 
1.9% 
[3489] 
24.7% 
[3489] 
 Male 3.3% 
[2698] 
20.2% 
[1309] 
2.1% 
[1309] 
18.1% 
[1309] 
Race/Ethnicity     
 Black 1.4% 
[2369] 
25.8% 
[1206] 
1.1% 
[1206] 
24.7% 
[1206] 
 White 3.8% 
[7246] 
24.7% 
[3500] 
2.3% 
[3500] 
22.4% 
[3500] 
 Other/unknown 5.7% 
[175] 
21.7% 
[92] 
2.2% 
[92] 
19.6% 
[92] 
Compensation     
 < $25K 1.7% 
[5174] 
17.5% 
[2451] 
1.6% 
[2451] 
15.9% 
[2451] 
 $25K-$50K 4.5% 
[3677] 
30.4% 
[1806] 
2.2% 
[1806] 
28.2% 
[1806] 
 >$50K 6.9% 
[939] 
40.1% 
[541] 
3.0% 
[541] 
37.2% 
[541] 
Tenure     
 < 2 years 4.3% 
[4053] 
20.1% 
[1795] 
2.3% 
[1795] 
17.8% 
[1795] 
 2 – 5 years 2.8% 
[2507] 
27.6% 
[1488] 
2.1% 
[1488] 
25.5% 
[1488] 
 > 5 years 2.2% 
[3230] 
27.9% 
[1515] 
1.5% 
[1515] 
26.4% 
[1515] 
Source: Authors’ calculations. The sample in column 1 is non-participants in June 2002 and June 2003 (some 
individuals will be included in the sample twice if non-participants in both 2002 and 2003).  The time frame over 
which enrollment is calculated is June through August 2002 and 2003 for column 1, and June through August 2004 
for the remaining columns.   The sample in the remaining columns is non-participants in June 2004.   Sample sizes 
for each cell reported in brackets. 
  
24
 
Table 7. Quick Enrollment Utilization by Employee Characteristics: 
Previously Non-Participating Employees at Company B 
 Before Quick 
Enrollment 
 
After Quick Enrollment 
 Fraction  
enrolling at any  
allocation 
Fraction  
enrolling at any  
allocation 
Fraction enrolling 
at non-default 
allocation 
Fraction enrolling 
at QE default 
allocation 
Age     
 < 30 3.5% 
[824] 
14.9% 
[697] 
5.7% 
[697] 
9.2% 
[697] 
 30 – 50 4.9% 
[1460] 
19.3% 
[1385] 
3.8% 
[1385] 
15.5% 
[1385] 
 > 50 2.9% 
[275] 
18.2% 
[302] 
5.6% 
[302] 
12.6% 
[302] 
Gender     
 Female 4.4% 
[611] 
16.7% 
[491] 
4.7% 
[491] 
12.0% 
[491] 
 Male 4.2% 
[1948] 
18.2% 
[1893] 
4.5% 
[1893] 
13.6% 
[1893] 
Tenure     
 < 2 years 6.8% 
[1341] 
23.0% 
[979] 
7.4% 
[979] 
15.6% 
[979] 
 2 – 5 years 1.9% 
[755] 
18.2% 
[898] 
3.5% 
[898] 
14.7% 
[898] 
 > 5 years 0.6% 
[463] 
7.5% 
[507] 
1.2% 
[507] 
6.3% 
[507] 
Source: Authors’ calculations. The sample in column 1 is non-participants in February 2002.  The sample in the 
remaining columns is non-participants in February 2003.  The time frame over which enrollment is calculated is 
February through May of 2002 for column 1, and February through May of 2003 for the remaining columns.  Sample 
sizes for each cell reported in brackets. 
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Figure 1. Timeline of Enrollment Mechanisms at Company A 
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FIGURE 3. 401(k) Participation by Tenure 
(Company A, Main Location)
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FIGURE 4A. 401(k) Participation 1 Month After Hire, 
by Hire Month (Company A, Main Location)
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FIGURE 4B. 401(k) Participation 3 Months After Hire, 
by Hire Month (Company A, Main Location)
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Note: 2004 three-month participation rates for April and May hires are not reported due to potential 
contamination with the June to August 2004 Quick Enrollment intervention for all employees.
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FIGURE 5. 401(k) Participation Rate 
(Company A, All Employees at All Locations)
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FIGURE 6. Contribution Rate Distribution of New Hires 
Enrolling Within 30 Days (Company A, Main Location)
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Note: Employees who did not enroll in the 401(k) plan within 30 days of hire are classified as having a zero 
contribution rate and are included in calculating the fraction of new hires at a given contribution rate, although 
we do not show the fraction of new hires with a zero contribution rate in this figure. 
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FIGURE 7. Contribution Rate Distribution Before and After 
Individual Meetings (Company A, All Locations)
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Note: Employees who had not enrolled in the 401(k) plan as of the snapshot date are classified as having a zero 
contribution rate and are included in calculating the fraction of total employees at a given contribution rate, 
although we do not show the fraction of employees with a zero contribution rate in this figure. 
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FIGURE 8.  401(k) Participation of Initial Non-Participants 
Over Time: (Company B)
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FIGURE 9.  Distribution of 401(k) Contribution Rates for 
New Participants:  (Company B)
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Endnotes 
 
1 See Hewitt (2005), Profit Sharing/401(k) Council of America (2001), and Vanguard (2001) for 
a description of the empirical distribution of automatic enrollment defaults. 
2 Hewitt Associates provided the data analyzed in this paper. 
3 The company reports that many of the Quick Enrollment cards were handed in during the 
orientation rather than taken home and mailed in. The deadline was not actually binding, 
although employees probably did not know this. 
4 Compensation data are not available for Company B. 
5 In the three-month participation regressions, the sample is restricted to employees hired during 
February and March since we do not observe three-month participation rates for employees hired 
in April and May of 2004 prior to the individual meetings that started in June 2004.  For the sake 
of comparability, we also restrict the sample of employees hired in 2002 and 2003 to those hired 
in February and March.  The results are qualitatively similar when employees hired in April and 
May of 2002 and 2003 are not excluded from the three-month participation regressions. 
6 OLS results, while not reported, yield qualitatively similar estimates. 
7 The results in Table 5 are qualitatively similar for three-month rather than one-month 
enrollment rates.  We report one-month enrollment rates in Table 5 because the sample sizes for 
some of the demographic subgroups are quite small if three-month enrollment rates are used. 
8 Employees could have enrolled using Quick Enrollment and then subsequently changed their 
asset allocation, which would also cause us to misclassify them. There are not likely to be many 
such employees given the frequency of our asset allocation observations. 
9 Employees attending new hire orientation at the main location in July and August 2003 were 
exposed to the Quick Enrollment intervention, thus attenuating the difference between the Quick 
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Enrollment population and the comparison population. These employees are a small fraction of 
the total non-participating population, so their presence should not have a significant impact.  
Note also that employees who were non-participants in 2002 and again in 2003 are included in 
the sample more than once (and, if non-participants again in 2004, are also in the sample for the 
last three columns of Table 6). 
10 We only observe contribution rates periodically, as described in Section I. In order to 
approximate the contribution rate distribution thirty days after hire, we use the contribution rate 
effective in the data extract closest to the employees’ hire date and assign a zero contribution rate 
to those who did not enroll within thirty days of hire. Because our closest contribution rate 
observation is no more than eleven months after an employee’s hire, this approximation should 
be very close to the actual distribution. 
11 The Quick Enrollment implementation at Company B used a yes/no reply card. The vast 
majority (88%) of cards returned had an affirmative election to participate in the 401(k) plan. 
12 7% of these individuals were hired in 2003, after the Quick Enrollment mailing list was 
formed. Another 9% were participating at the time the list was compiled. This leaves 84% 
unaccounted for. 
13 This might include giving employees the option of explicitly stating that they would rather 
make their own elections using the standard channels; there is no need to restrict sophisticated 
employees who have strong preferences about their retirement savings. 
